As formas elementares da vida eletrônica


Pesquisa

Tecnoestética e documentação

  • Building a transistor
  • Ken Shirriff’s blog – Computer history, restoring vintage computers, IC reverse engineering, and whatever
  • THE TRANSISTOR MUSEUM
  • Computer History Museum
  • bitsavers.org
  • The Chip History Center
  • Richi’s Lab
  • EEVblog Electronics Community Forum
  • Frank’s Electron tube Pages
  • electron Tube Data sheets
  • Mikhail Svarichevsky
  • Sam Zeloof
  • Silicon Zoo (Molecular Expressions)
  • Visual6502.org

    História e funcionamento do transistor

    História e funcionamento do microchip

    Fabricação de microchips

    “Lixo eletrônico”

    Virada cibernética

    Subjetividade eletrônica

    Capitalismo eletrônico

    Materialidade eletrônica
    As seguintes aulas de Friedrich Kittler, ministradas em 2005 e 2010 na European Graduate School, apresentam uma amostra do tipo de contribuição que seu trabalho oferece para uma sociologia da microeletrônica:

    CITAÇÕES
    Think about your Facebook page. All of us could have described our group or network of family, friends, and ac- quaintances based on our mental assessment of the people we are closest to and interact with the most. But now that net- work is visible as a set of tiny faces, avatars, and names on an electronic page that we have on our desks, carry around in our pockets, and spend a great deal of time on. We can now see and measure how much we actually interact. The sociologist’s abstract representation of our relationships has sprung to electronic life in a virtual world that is increasingly the world we actually live in. Moreover, it has never been easier to con- nect with new people or organizations. Tap, click, connect. (Slaughter 2017:44-5)

    In the early 1980s, David Chaum conducted a quest for the seemingly impossible answer to a problem that many people didn’t consider a problem in the first place: how can the domain of electronic life be extended without further compromising our privacy? Or — even more daring — can we do this by actually increasing privacy? In the process he figured out how cryptography could produce an electronic version of the dollar bill. (Levy 2001:269-70)

    The only solution is to accept instantaneous dissemination as a fact of electronic life. (Chrichton 1983:48)

    Defined broadly, virtual reality sometimes stretches over many aspects of electronic life. Beyond computer-generated desktops, it includes the virtual persons we know through telephone or computer networks. It includes the entertainer or politician who appears on television to interact on the phone with callers. It includes virtual universities where stu- dents attend classes on line, visit virtual classrooms, and so- cialize in virtual cafeterias. (Heim 1993:110-1)

    Can automedia be not only a theoretical term, but also a lab? This quotation from Lauren Berlant’s 2010 interview with Jay Prosser sets the scene for what might be another kind of autobiographical theory, a possibility that opens up our notion of what getting a life, narrating a life, and even having a life (good, bad, unintelligible, queer) means in light of what could be called digital living. I like the idea of life writing or even life making as a lab because it suggests that we need to change our methods of looking at life online. What can we do in this lab? We can test, blow up, and maybe drink the potion of electronic life as a series of scenes just to see what happens next. We can figure out if what we know about electronic life (about getting it, loving it, resisting it, losing it) tells us anything new or interesting about living in the offline world. Perhaps some aspects of the debate about “liveness,” whether the mediation of representational technology adds to or eliminates aspects of what life can mean, can be considered here (Duffet 313). For example, is cyber life actually life? Can it be as autobiographical as other modes of representation? When “live” events are digitally reproduced in online media, what happens to our understanding of what an event means? (Rak 2015:161)

    Where was the line to be drawn between what had become routine corporate monitoring and unsanctioned invasion of privacy? When, in June 2013, Edward Snowden revealed that the sluices through which electronic life now poured were being operated by the major internet intermediaries in cooperation with the U.S. Na- tional Security Agency, the question forced its way into global politics (Schiller 2014:136)

    We live in a world where the battles and dramas between the formal and informal, the ill structured and the well structured, the standardized and the wild, are being continuously fought. These battles are sometimes benign and sometimes tremendously helpful to humankind, such as the standardization of climate change data (or attempts to do so). However, attempts to overstandardize (using tools such as electronic surveillance) are haunting social justice. So thickly imbricated are these battles now with electronic life and daily offline life that it is no longer a question of choice. If not now, when? (Star 2010:614-5)

    Although most forms of speech are protected, not all forms of speech are morally or ethically acceptable. An event from my electronic life makes this argument. […] One morning, innocently enough, a discussion began on our de- partment email list that soon became a perfect case for analyzing the trend of calling clearly biased sites “informational.” (Gurak 2001:56)

    In conversation, the people involved are face to face, interacting and constantly adjusting to one another to insure understanding. On public occasions, each listener’s understanding is guided by the speaker and by others in the audience, which tends to rule out ec- centric, individual reactions in favor of more normative responses. Reading, by its nature, however, makes for the private, inward-tumed self, the separated individuals who make up modern society’s “lonely crowd.” Orality reinforces communal, public life, favors the outgoing personality, and it makes for group conformity. Oral life is tribal life, reading makes for modem society made up of separate individuals, what electronic life will be we are only beginning to glimpse. (Kernan 1990:131)

    When I purchased my copy, the booksellers went to great lengths to inform me how several costumers had brought their copies of The Telephone Book back to the store, certain that they had received a copy filled with printer’s errors. I was never quite able to determine if I was being let in on an inside joke or if this was merely the standard sales rap adopted by the booksellers in order to quell customer anxieties. […] The layout, however, is no joke; on the contrary, it helps to physically bond the book itself to the system of telephony as it is currently manifest in various telephone systems, from apocryphal small-town manually operated exchanges up through what Colin Cherry called “the biggest machine in the world” – the global system of long-distance telephony. The layout also links the study to the postmodern world and the ways in which we live the electronic life, so to speak. The actual physical structure of the book represents not only the uses of the telephone system to convey a variety of information but also, and just as importantly, the often-unconsidered but nevertheless always-audible supervisory and control signals of that system, as well as the recordings, busy signals, echoes, interference, static, crossed lines, faintness, cracklings, and so on. (Schwoch 1991:198)
    In the spirit of The Telephone Book, this review was written on a personal computer with internal fax card and faxed to the editors. Prior to its publication, it existed only in electronic form. (Schwoch 1991:201)

    Several respondents discussed the need to make trade-offs in exchange for the conveniences of electronic life. Roger, a 59-year-old statistician, states: ‘It’s really a balance between how useful is this to you versus any harm that might come from disclosure of your information.’ (Best 2010:18)

    Participants in this longitudinal study of Internet users from 2000 to 2001 (Pew Internet and American Life Project, 2002) felt the Internet had improved connections with family, resulting in better family relationships. In addition, the expansion of extended family member contact and the renewal of family ties via e-mail were reported to be giving electronic life to the extended family. (Meszaros 2004:383)

    The usefulness of artificial satellites and space vehicles is greatly dependent on the provision of reliable long-life power sources for the operation of their electrical and electronic equipment. The contrast between the relatively long physical life of the Russian satellites 1957 alpha and beta and their brief periods of electronic life, signified by signM transmission, has forcefully demonstrated this fact. (Zahl e Ziegler 1960:32)

    Not all firewalls are created equal, and it is incumbent on the security aware organization to meet the real offensive threats of electronic life with an equally strong defensive posture. (Schwartau 1994:11)

    As we electronically network our classrooms and link them with institutional, national, and international networks, we join a new electronic society. At present, there are no shared rules for social life on a network, just as in Jefferson’s time there were no agreed-upon rules for social life in an American republic. Similarly, it is not clear where, in the emerging electronic society, the deciding, or deliberation, of rights and responsibilities should take place. Why not deliberate in our writing classrooms‘? Surely, decisions are beginning to be made in other forums, as legislators write laws and as commercial enterprises develop products and services to set the conditions for electronic life. […] What kind of electronic society do we as writers and teachers want and need? (Smith 1996:18)

    The domain of objects and machines, as much as capital itself, is increas- ingly presented in the guise of an animistic religion. Everything is put into question up to and including the status of truth. Certainties and convictions are held to be the truth. Reason needs not to be employed. Simply believing and surrendering oneself is enough. As a result, public deliberation, which is one of democracy’s essential features, no longer consists in discussing and seeking collectively, before the eyes of all citizens, the truth and, ultimately, justice. The great opposition no longer being that between truth and falsity, the worst thing is henceforth doubt. For, in the concrete struggle opposing us to our enemies, doubt hinders the total freeing of the voluntarist, emotional, and vital energies necessary for the use of violence and, if necessary, for shedding blood. […] The reserves of credulity have similarly accrued. Paradoxically, this accrual has gone hand in hand with an exponential acceleration of techno- logical development and industrial innovation, the unremitting digitalization of facts and things, and the relative generalizing of what might be called electronic life and its double or robotically adjusted life.26 A new and unprecedented phase in the history of humanity has effectively begun, in which it will become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish human organisms from electronic flows, the life of humans from that of processors. This phase is made possible by accumulated know-how concerning the storage of enormous data flows, by the extreme power and speed of their processing, and by advances in algorithmic computation. The terminal point of this digital-cognitive turn could well be a widespread infiltration of microchips into biological tissues. Already under way, this humanomachinic coupling has not only led to the genesis of new mythologies of the technical object. It has also had the immediate consequence of calling into question the very status of the modern subject stemming from the humanist tradition. (Mbembe 2019:55-6)

    From a Wittgensteinian position there are several potential dangers here. First, and as already discussed, there is the potential for a breakdown in meaning and understanding associated with a new electronic form of life. However, even if forms of life and common meaning and understanding are to a certain extent maintained, there is also a potential splintering of forms of life, as some people may be denied access to ‘the’ electronic form of life, or they may only have access to inferior technology which denies access to certain networks or restricts them, controlling forms of information delivery and permitting non-creative forms of interaction only, to certain communities. […] Wittgenstein talks of how he found the world and seems to see it as very difficult to change the world. This is probably the outcome of his early reading of Schopenhauer and his adoption and use of certain notions from Schopenhauer, particularly in the Tractatus and the Notebooks. But it means that to a certain extent one is constituted by the form of life into which one is born and one cannot change that world substantially – at least that is Wittgenstein’s message. If forms of life have a substantial role then in establishing or constituting the self, then new forms of electronic life will constitute subjects in certain new ways. But we have already seen cases of this. For example, within the moves to neo-liberalism which Western nations have undergone in the last half of the 20th century we can notice a major change in the notion of personal autonomy away from the rationally guided forms (Kantian principles of universality) of autonomy to a notion of autonomy as making continuous economic choices. The utterance ‘Shop ‘til you drop’ is not a descriptive act but a performative act (Austin 1962) to convince people as to what they should do and become – continuous consumer choosers in both the high street market and in services such as education and training. (Marshall 1998:43)

    When seeing „live‟ images in real life, this fragmentation is still in force, since we only „see‟ or cognise an image once it has been sent to our brains in a synaptically fragmented way, and then interpreted or reassembled, by another part of our brain, to resemble what we like to call the „original‟ image in the „real world‟. Scientifically and biologically, there appears to be no great difference between „seeing‟ in real life and „watching‟ in simulated electronic life. (Merwe 2010:49 nota 17)

    In Britain, a country where the popular use of cutting-edge electronic facilities lags cyberyears behind the Far East, the users can still trust ‘social networking’ to manifest their freedom of choice, and even believe it to be a means of youthful rebellion and self-assertion (a supposition made all the more credible by the panic alarms which their unprecedented, web-induced and web- addressed zeal for self-exposure triggers among their security- obsessed teachers and parents day in, day out, and by the nervous reactions of the headmasters who ban the likes of Bebo from the school servers). But in South Korea, for instance, where most social life is already routinely electronically mediated (or rather where social life has already turned into an electronic life or cyberlife, and where most ‘social life’ is conducted primarily in the company of a computer, iPod or mobile, and only secondarily with other fleshy beings), it is obvious to the young that they don’t have even so much as a sniff of choice; where they live, living social life electronically is no longer a choice, but a ‘take it or leave it’ necessity. ‘Social death’ awaits those few who have as yet failed to link up into Cyworld, South Korea’s cybermarket leader in the ‘show-and-tell culture’. (Bauman 2007:2)

    Anderson tempts us to hear that kind of depth in this piece: to interpret one or the other of the chords as simply ornamental. But while this illusion is continually being raised in “O Superman,” it is just as continually voided. Thus what we finally have is neither narrative nor depth, but only our craving for both in the face of what is perhaps only the digital technology that guarantees postmodern electronic life.29 Anderson deliberately activates beloved narratives and demonstrates to us that we are still highly invested in them, even though they may be bankrupt. Or worse. (McClary 2002:144)

    Could there be a whole new world of electronic life forms possible, of which computer viruses are only the most rudimentary sort? Per- haps they are the electronic analog of the simplest one-celled creatures, which were only the tiny beginning of life on earth. What would be the electronic equivalent of a flower, or a dog? Where could it lead? (Ludwig 1996:8-9)
    Before the advent of personal computers, the electronic domain in which a computer virus might “live” was extremely limited. Computers were rare, and they had many different kinds of CPU’s and operating systems. So a tinkerer might have written a virus, and let it execute on his system. However, there would have been little danger of it escaping and infecting other machines. It remained under the control of its master. The age of the mass-pro- duced computer opened up a whole new realm for viruses, though. Millions of machines all around the world, all with the same basic architecture and operating system make it possible for a computer virus to escape and begin a life of its own. It can hop from machine to machine, accomplishing the goals programmed into it, with no one to control it and few who can stop it. And so the virus became a viable form of electronic life in the 1980’s. (Ludwig 1996:13)
    A more sophisticated version of such a program might rely on deceiving that man at the console to propagate itself. This program is known as a worm. The computer virus overcomes the roadblock of operator control by hiding itself in other programs. Thus it gains access to the CPU simply because people run programs that it happens to have attached itself to without their knowledge. The ability to attach itself to other pro- grams is what makes the virus a viable electronic life form. That is what puts it in a class by itself. The fact that a computer virus attaches itself to other programs earned it the name “virus.” (Ludwig 1996:14)

    What would a virus that had become what it is primarily by evolution be like? […] Well, for one thing, we know that living organisms are incredibly self-serving. I cannot therefore imagine that the Cambrian electronic life on the Internet would care for me any more than a cockroach cares for me. It would gladly eat my food but run like hell when the lights went on. However, I expect there might be an important difference. […] To be successful in a Darwinian sense, a piece of self-reproducing code must be executed. If it is not executed, it will have no progeny, and it will die out. There are essentially two ways for such code to be executed. One is to hide and gain a slice of CPU time on the sly. The other way is to induce the operator to execute it. I think both of these components will be essential to Cambrian electronic life. (Ludwig 1996:243 [in Leeson 1996])

    McLuhan [25] insisted on understanding the importance of the technological changes aside from opinions: «The effects of technology are not produced to the level of opinions or concepts, but they modify the sensory indexes, or guidelines of perception, regularly and without finding resistance». The city as a classroom (that regrettably did not have the atten- tion that the educators wanted it to have) marked a clear aim; to sharpen the perception of the secondary school student about the cities where they live, and therefore mitigate the effects that the electronic life could have on them. McLuhan wanted young students to be more able to explore their surroundings find clues that enables them to better understand the nature of the contemporary world120. (Contreras et al. 2011:277 [in Ciastellardi et al 2011])

    The machine interface may amplify an amoral indifference to human relationships. Comput- ers often eliminate the need to respond directly to what takes place between humans. People do not just observe one another, they become “lurkers.” Without direct human presence, participation becomes op- tional. Electronic life converts primary bodily presence into telepresence, introducing a remove between rcpresented presences. True, in bodily life we often play at altering our identity with different clothing, masks, and nicknames, but electronics installs the illusion that we are “having it both ways,” keeping a distance while at the same time “putting ourselves on the line.” On-line existence is intrinsically ambiguous, like the purchased passion of the customers in the House of Blue Lights in Gibson’s Burning Ciñóme: “The customers are torn between needing someone and wanting to be alone at the same time, which has probably always been the ñame of that particular game, even before we had the neuroelectronics to enable them to have it both ways” (191). As the expanding global network permits the passage of bodily representa- tions, “having it both ways” may reduce trust and spread cynical anomie. (Heim 1991:76 [in Benedikt 1991])

    Finally, many might interpret a convergence of networked machines and humans as collectivism, or a globalised electronic life form as a threat. But we do not really know what it will mean. (Imken 1999:105 [in Crang et al. 1999])

    Consider two principle categorizations of the form of the human of the future, one more biological-like: a bio/machine hybrid of any desired form; and one not biological at all: an “electronic life” on the computer networks. Human as machine, and human in machine. […] Human as machine is perhaps more easily conceived. We afready have crude prosthetic implants, artificial limbs, valves, and entire organs. The continuing improvements in the old-style mechanical technology slowly increase the thoroughness of human-machine integration. […] The electronic life form of human in machine is even more alien to our current conceptions of humanity. (Gullichsen 1994:199 [in Leary 1994])

    Because of the permeabi1ity, even indistinction, between the times ofwork and ofleisure, the skills and gestures that once would have been restricted to the workplace are now a universal part of the 24n texture of one’s electronic life. (Crary 2013:58)

    One exception to the general neglect of the history of modern electronics is the invention of the transistor. See Charles Weiner, “How the Transistor Emerged,” IEEE Spectrum (January 1973): 24—33; Lillian H. Hoddeson, “The Discovery of the Point- contact Transistor,” Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 12 (1981): 41-76. An important study is Ernest Braun and Stuart MacDonald, Revolution in Miniature: The History and Impact of Semiconductor Electronics (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978); see also idem, “The Transistor and Attitude to Change,” American Journal of Physics 45 (November 1977): 1061—65. Of several accounts of the transistor written by Bell Laboratories personnel, one merits mention here: William Shockley, “The Path to the Conception of the Junction Transistor,” IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices ED-23 (July 1976): 587-620. See also the special issue of the trade journal Electronics 53 (17 April 1980); M. Gibbons and C. Johnson, “Science, Technology and the Development of the Transistor,” in B. Barnes and D. Edge, eds., Science in Context (Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 1982), pp. 177—85; S. Millman, ed., A History of Engineering and Science in the Bell System: Physical Sciences (1925-1980) (Murray Hill, NJ: Bell Laboratories, 1983), 4: 71-107; Hoddeson, “The Roots of Solid-state Research at Bell Labs,” Physics Today 30 (March 1977): 23-30; and idem, “The Entry of the Quantum Theory of Solids into the Bell Telephone Laboratories, 1925-40: A Case-Study of the Industrial Application of Fundamental Science,” Minerva 18 (1980): 422-47. On the integrated circuit, see Michael F. Wolff, “The Genesis of the Integrated Circuit,” IEEE Spectrum (August 1976): 45-53; and Jack S. Kelly, “Invention of the Integrated Circuit,” IEEE Transactions on Electron Devices ED-23 (July 1976): 648—54. (Misa 1985:254 nota 1 [in Smith 1985])

    No matter what is the preferred perspective on AI, a dramatic point will be attained when transistor density in the central processing unit of a computer reaches the human-brain equivalent. This in quantity terms equals a number of about one hundred billion, that is, the amount of neurons in the human brain. Today, a common processor chip (for example, the Intel 486) comprises 1.2 million transistors. With present trends in chip manufacture it is not unrealistic to envisage a transistor density of one hundred million on a single chip within ten years. A comparable development within parallel computer processing should make possible the use of a thousand processors, thus realizing the brain equivalent with a possible clock speed of several hundred GHz. Which AI prophesies will then be realized, we can only wait and see as the only predictable aspect of the future is its unpredictability. (Skyttner 2005:326)

    A miniaturização dos componentes eletrônicos ao longo das últimas décadas é um capítulo de fundamental importância na história da tecnologia no século 20. Com a introdução de transistores, semicondutores, circuitos integrados e chips, a relação entre forma e função, técnica e materiais, se alterou de modo definitivo e se tornou muito mais casual do que causal. Na era eletrônica, o objeto já não pode mais ser considerado uma unidade integral, nem do ponto de vista técnico e muito menos do estético, mas, antes, deve ser entendido como uma compilação de códigos especializados superpostos de maneira mais ou menos livre. A partir de um microprocessador, cuja forma aparente é tão negligível que é praticamente uma não forma e cujo funcionamento permanece misterioso para a quase totalidade de seus usuários, faz-se possível gerar virtualmente qualquer forma ou função (THACKARA, 1988: 183-186). E a partir de uma linguagem binária que, de tão elementar, quase desmerece a noção de linguagem, faz-se possível abranger todas as linguagens, todas as formas de expressão, veiculá-las e traduzi-las de um meio de registro para outro, com uma facilidade nunca antes imaginada. O tempo da incompatibilidade de qualquer coisa com qualquer outra coisa talvez esteja prestes a passar, conforme atesta um universo sempre em expansão de filmes e video­ games, em que todos os temas e tratamentos se misturam sem nenhum compromisso com a chamada realidade mas apenas uma preocupação crescente com
    o realismo da experiência representada. (Cardoso 2004:209)

    CORPUS

    CORPUS

    CORPUS

    BAUMAN_2007_Consuming life_Book.pdf
    BENEDIKT(ed)_ 1991_Cyberspace – first steps_Book.pdf
    BERRYetal(eds)_2010_Electronic elsewheres_Book
    BEST_2010_Living in the control society_IJoCS.pdf
    BRAUNeMACDONALD_1978_Revolution in miniature_Book
    CARDOSO_2004_Uma Introducao a Historia do Design_Book.PDF
    CIASTELLARDIetal(eds)_2011_McLuhan galaxy conference_Proceedings.pdf
    CRANGetal(eds)_1999_Virtual geographies_Book.pdf
    CRARY_2013_24-7_Book.pdf
    CRICHTON_1983_Electronic life_Book.pdf
    DRUMMONDePATERSON(eds)_1985_Television in transition_Book
    DUNNEeRABY_2001_Design noir – the secret life of electronic objects_Book.pdf
    FREEMANeFERTIG_1995_Lifestreams – electronic life_AAAI.pdf
    GESER_2002_Towards a (Meta-)sociology of the digital sphere_Paper.pdf
    GLISSMANeHOFFLIN_2005_Elf – electronic life forms_SIGGRAPH.pdf
    GURAK_2001_Techno-rage_BookChapt.pdf
    HEIM_1993_The metaphysics of virtual reality_Book.pdf
    HOLMES_2008_Electronic & Experimental Music_Book.pdf
    JACOBSEN(ed)_2009_The Contemporary Goffman_Book.pdf
    KERNAN_1990_Technology & literature_BookChapt.pdf
    KIRSCHENBAUM_2016_Track Changes – A Literary History of Word_Book.pdf
    LEARY_1994_Chaos & cyber culture_Book.pdf
    LEESON(ed)_1996_Clicking in_Book.pdf
    LEVY_2001_Crypto_Book
    LUDWIG_1996_The little black book of computer viruses_Book.pdf
    MARSHALL_1998_A wittgensteinian approach to communication in the mode of information_Access.pdf
    MBEMBE_2019_Necropolitics_Book.pdf
    MCCLARY_2002_Feminine endings – music gender sexuality_Book.pdf
    McMULLENetal_2019_Electronic life histories – e-waste_WW.pdf
    MERWE_2010_Gramma-topology_PhD.pdf
    MESZAROS_2004_The wired family_ABS.pdf
    MEYEROWITZ_1985_No sense of place_Book
    MILLER_1995_The presentation of self in electronic life_Paper2.pdf
    RAK_2015_Life writing versus automedia_Biography.pdf
    ROBINSeHEPWORTH_1988_Electronic spaces_Futures
    ROBINSON_2007_The cyberself – symbolic interaction_NMS.pdf
    SCHILLER_2014_The sponsor system resurgent_BookChapt.pdf
    SCHWARTAU_1994_To net or not to net_NS.pdf
    SCHWOCH_1991_The telephone book_Discourse.pdf
    SCHWOCHetal(eds)_1992_Media knowleddge_Book.pdf
    SIMONDON_2005_Linvention dans les techniques 2_Book.pdf
    SKYTTNER_2005_General systems theory_Book.pdf
    SLADE_2006_Made to break – technology & obsolescence in America_Book.pdf
    SMITH_1996_Thomas Jeffersons computer_C&C.pdf
    SMITH(ed)_1985_Military enterprise & technological change_Book.pdf
    SLAUGHTER_2017_The chessboard & the web_Book
    STAR_2010_This is not a boundary object_ST&HV.pdf
    ZAHLeZIEGLER_1960_Sources for satellites & space vehicles_AotIGY.pdf

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