Uma velha senhora com seu pequeno pet dog? (Haraway in Gane 2006)
Obs: “NG” indica falas de Nicholas Gane, e “DH” indica falas de Donna Haraway. Na ausência de indicação, a fala é de Haraway.
HARAWAY & LATOUR
I give more space to the critic in the basement than Bruno Latour. I have more sympathy with critical theory than Bruno does – much more. And I’m much more willing to live with indigestible intellectual and political heritages. I need to hold on to impossible heritages more than I suspect Bruno wants to. Our kinds of creativity take different directions but they’re allied. (Haraway in Gane 2006:139)
The fourth wound to primary narcissism – this question of the relationalities of us with that which isn’t human – begins to get at our constitutive relationalities with the machinic but also more than the machinic –with the non-living and the non-human. Bruno Latour is trying to do that too. I think this is where lots of us are because this is where many urgent questions in the world are. (Haraway in Gane 2006:141)
NG: In the ‘Manifesto’ you declare that ‘Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we ourselves frighteningly inert’ […]. Is this a playful statement aimed at provoking thinkers who continue to treat human agency as something sacred, prior to or independent of machines, or is it a more serious declaration about the emergence of intelligent technologies that possess creative powers and agencies that rival those of so-called ‘human’ beings? DH: It is both. And it is also complaint about the passivity of my own political friends and myself and my intellectual buddies. It’s a complaint. It’s like Bruno Latour’s complaint about the stupidity of critical theorists in just doing critique once again, in being stuck where Adorno and Horkheimer were much more legitimately stuck. What they did then needed to be done. But it is crazy to be stuck in that relentless complaint about technology and techno-culture and not getting the extraordinary liveliness that is also about us. It’s a very grumpy remark about the kind of work that needs to be done, and which many people are doing. All you have to do is look where creative cultural and intellectual work is being done on the ground, in and out of writing technologies of all sorts. (Haraway in Gane 2006:141-2)
NG: When I spoke to Bruno Latour he said that the big challenge now is to work out how to collect or classify things if you think the world through connections. DH: Exactly right, and that is where I think Bruno and I are in relentless alignment, even as we give each other indigestion about some of the ways we do it. I think we love each other’s work because that is what matters. (Haraway in Gane 2006:145)
DH: […] I refused to read Deleuze and Guattari until last year. I’m a very recent reader, and now I know why I refused to read them. Everyone kept saying I’m a Deleuzian, and I kept saying ‘no way’. This is one of the ways women thinkers are made to seem derivative of male philosophers, who are often their contemporaries – made to be derivative and the same, when we are neither. My Deleuze is Rosi Braidotti’s feminist trans-mutant, a very different kettle of fish […]. NG: I’ve noticed this tendency in Latour. DH: He’s been called to account on it many times. He’s reformable, he’ll come round! In print, he cites Stengers now, and Charis Thompson, and Shirley Strum, and even me […]. The citation practices are not symmetrical, but here the exchange is real. (Haraway in Gane 2006:156-7)
ÉTICA
I think that curiosity – the beginning of fulfilment of the obligation to know more as a consequence of being called into response – is a critical axis of an ethics not rooted in human exceptionalism. […] We need new category work. We need to live the consequences of non-stop curiosity inside mortal, situated, relentlessly relational worlding. (Haraway in Gane 2006:143)
DELEUZE e GUATTARI
Oddly then, and I think tragically, Derrida gets doubly caught in the very masculine exceptionalism, called human exceptionalism, that he is deconstructing, first, by his single-eyed vision of the one and only unclothed organ and second, by his failing the obligation of curiosity about what the cat cared about in that looking. […] Deleuze and Guattari are much, much worse. I think their becoming-animal chapter […] is an insult because they don’t give a flying damn about animals – critters are an excuse for their anti-oedipal project. Watch the way they excoriate old women and their dogs as they glorify the wolf pack in their ‘horizon of becoming’ and lines of flight. Deleuze and Guattari make me furious with their utter lack of curiosity about actual relations among animals and between animals and people, and the way they despise the figure of the domestic in their glorification of the wild in their monomaniacal anti-oedipal project. And people pick them up as if they were helpful in figuring sociality beyond the human. Nonsense! Despite his cyclopean lapses, Derrida is much more helpful. (Haraway in Gane 2006:143)
It’s not so much ‘workers of the world unite’ – though it is also that, along with the far from obvious task to figure who the workers of the world are. […] But for me it’s more ‘companion species of the world unite’. […] [N]ow I’m trying to use that unsophisticated term – companion species – that too many folks want to mean Deleuze’s despised old lady with her small pet dog. (Haraway in Gane 2006:156)
The ‘Manifesto’ argued that you can, even must, inhabit the despised place. The despised place then was the cyborg, which is not true now. In a way, the despised place now is that old lady with her dog in Deleuze and Guattari’s chapter on ‘Becoming-Animal’. […] I refused to read Deleuze and Guattari until last year. I’m a very recent reader, and now I know why I refused to read them. Everyone kept saying I’m a Deleuzian, and I kept saying ‘no way’. This is one of the ways women thinkers are made to seem derivative of male philosophers, who are often their contemporaries – made to be derivative and the same, when we are neither. My Deleuze is Rosi Braidotti’s feminist trans-mutant, a very different kettle of fish (e.g. Braidotti, 2006) (Haraway in Gane 2006:156)
MATERIALIDADE
DH: […] I agree with Kate Hayles for the most part, but I would it put it a little differently that maybe has some significant difference. Of course there are barriers. I can’t believe the blissed-out technoidiocy of people who talk about downloading human consciousness onto a chip. NG: You mean Hans Moravec? DH: Yes, I mean these guys actually talk about this – and they are guys. It’s a kind of techno-masculinism of a self-caricaturing kind. They ought to be ashamed of themselves! I find myself regularly unable to believe they mean it. And then I read their stuff and I have to get it that they do mean it. It’s stupid and silly, and hardly worth commenting on except that powerful people turn it into projects and so you have to comment. (Haraway in Gane 2006:146)
CRÍTICA DA IMATERIALIDADE
the virtual isn’t immaterial. Anyone who thinks it is, is nuts. (Haraway in Gane 2006:148)
Believing that somehow there is this seamless, friction-free becoming is an ideological mistake that we ought to be astonished that we can still make. (Haraway in Gane 2006:148)
HISTORICIDADE DO CIBORGUE
I think the cyborg story is a fairly historically limited one, and it’s not all human–machine joinings. I’m interested in historical differences as much as I am [in] continuity and I think the cyborg way of doing who we are has a pretty recent history. Maybe you could date it from the late 19th century, or maybe it’s better to track it though the 1930s, or through the Second World War, or after. Depending on what you want to foreground, you could track it in different ways, but it’s pretty recent. […] Cyborgs have to do with this interesting critter called information, and you really can’t treat that a historically – as if ‘information’ refers to something existing all the time, everywhere. That’s a mistake because you don’t get at the ferocity and specificity of now. (Haraway in Gane 2006:146)
SER HUMANO É SER UMA COLEÇÃO DE RELACIONALIDADES
Human beings have always been in partnership. To be human is to be a congeries of relationalities, even if you are talking about Homo erectus. So it’s relationalities all the way down, but they aren’t always about machines, much less information technologies. (Haraway in Gane 2006:147)
BREAKDOWN
Something is really seriously wrong and yet that’s not all that’s happening. That’s our resource for remaking connections – we’re never starting from scratch. (Haraway in Gane 2006:151)
Some of the phenomenologists in Chile in the period before Pinochet were interested in breakdown. This is an extraordinarily interesting place, where you get at things that aren’t working and where the fantasy of perfect communication isn’t sustainable. Maybe because of my Catholic inheritance of fascination with figuration, I’m interested in tropes as places where you trip. Tropes are way more than metaphors and metonymies and the narrow orthodox list. Noise is only one figure, one trope that I’m interested in. Tropes are about stutterings, trippings. They are about breakdowns and that’s why they are creative. That is why you get somewhere you weren’t before, because something didn’t work. (Haraway in Gane 2006:151-2)
COMPARAR COM ESSA FRASE DE HARAWAY EM OUTRA ENTREVISTA: Terry was one of the early Artificial Intelligence researchers when he was a young graduate student and now teaches at Stanford. Philosophically he deepened his phenomenological critique with Flores, who was a political refugee from Allende’s Chile. So the combination of information technologies, phenomenology, and the realities of harsh lived political realities are all very much a part of their perspective. For them breakdown is a word for those moments when denaturalization occurs, when what is taken for granted can no longer be taken for granted precisely because there is a glitch in the system. (HARAWAY, Donna. 1998. How like a leaf: an interview with Thyrza Nichols Goodeve. New York: Routledge, p.114-5)
FABULATION as LEAP OF FAITH (fact/fiction)
There’s some kind of without warrant insistence that the fantasy of an elsewhere is not escapism but it’s a powerful tool. […] You don’t have any ground for that, it’s a kind of act of faith. (Haraway in Gane 2006:152)
Fact and fiction have this interesting etymological connection and fact is this past participle – already done, and fiction is still in the making. (Haraway in Gane 2006:153)
Clynes and Kline are a great example. They were actually involved in real projects, in an institutional environment of multiple real projects. Social reality was being made to happen there, and it was fantastically dreamworked. (Haraway in Gane 2006:153)
FUNÇÃO e FUNCIONAMENTO
I think almost any serious knowledge project is a thinking technology insofar as it re-does its participants. It reaches into you and you aren’t the same afterwards. Technologies re-arrange the world for purposes, but go beyond function and purpose to something open, something not yet. (Haraway in Gane 2006:154)
GANE, Nicholas. 2006. When we have never been human, what is to be done? Interview with Donna Haraway. Theory, Culture & Society 23(7-8):135-58.
LaSPA is located at the Institute of Philosophy and Human Sciences (